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For the classical marriage model (introduced in Gale and Shapley, 1962) eciency and
envy-freeness are not always compatible, i.e., fair matchings do not always exist. How-
ever, for many allocation of indivisible goods models (see Velez, 2008, and references
therein), fairness can be restored if a suciently large amount of money is available
for distribution/compensation as well. Interpreting the agents as the objects to be
allocated, one might try to restore fairness for marriage markets in a similar fashion.
We prove that there are marriage markets where no amount of money can guarantee
the existence of a fair allocation.
JEL classication: C78, D63.
Keywords: eciency, fairness, marriage markets, envy-freeness
1 Marriage Markets: The Classical Model
There is a nite set of agents N, which can be partitioned into a set of women W and a
set of men M. We denote a generic agent by i, a generic woman by w, and a generic man
by m. Each agent i has a complete and transitive preference relation i over the agents on
the other side of the market and being alone, i.e., a woman w has preferences over M [fwg
and a man m has preferences over W [ fmg. A marriage market (Gale and Shapley, 1962)
is a pair (N;(i)i2N) such that N = W [ M and W \ M = ;.1 A matching for marriage
market (N;(i)i2N); is a function  : N ! N such that (i) (w) 62 M ) (w) = w,
(ii) (m) 62 W ) (m) = m, and (iii) (w) = m , (m) = w. If (i) 6= i then we call (i)
agent i's mate. If (i) = i then we call i a single.
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1Note that we do not require preferences to be strict.
12 Marriage Markets with Money
Value Functions, Money, and Quasi-Linear Utilities
We assume that each agent i's preference relation is represented by a value function vi.
Hence, vw : M [fwg ! R and vm : W [fmg ! R are such that vw(m) represents the value
for woman w of being matched to man m, vm(w) represents the value for man m of being
matched to woman w, and vi(i) represents the value for agent i of being single. Furthermore,
for all agents i;j;k 2 N, j i k if and only if vi(j)  vi(k). Let v = (vi)i2N denote the list
of agents' value functions.
Next, we assume that apart from matching the agents, we can also distribute an amount
of money 
 2 R among the agents in N.2 Since the set of agents is xed throughout this
paper, an economy is a pair e  (v;
). We denote the set of all economies by E. A feasible
allocation for economy e  (v;
) is a pair z = (;) consisting of a matching  and a vector
 2 RN such that
P
i = 
.3 The bundle received by agent i at z is zi = ((i);i).
We assume that agents only care about their own consumptions and that preferences
over bundles are quasi-linear: agent i's preference relation over feasible allocations and over
bundles is represented by a utility function ui such that for all feasible allocations z  (;),
ui(z) = ui((i);i) = vi((i)) + i.
An allocation z is (Pareto)-ecient if it is feasible and there is no other feasible allocation
that Pareto-dominates it, i.e., there exists no z0 such that for all i 2 N, ui(z0)  ui(z) and for
some j 2 N, uj(z0) > uj(z). It is easy to see that because of quasi-linearity of preferences,
allocation z  (;
) is ecient if and only if matching  is ecient, i.e., there exists no 0
such that for all i 2 N, vi(0(i))  vi((i)) and for some j 2 N, vj(0(j)) > vj((j)).
An allocation z is envy-free if it is feasible and each agent nds his bundle at least as
desirable as that of each other agent (Foley, 1967), i.e., a feasible allocation z  (;)
satises no-envy if
(a.1) no woman w prefers to be matched to another woman  w's mate and consume   w:
if ( w) 2 M, then uw(z) = uw((w);w)  uw(( w);  w);
(a.2) no woman w envies a single woman  w:
if ( w) =  w, then uw(z) = uw((w);w)  uw(w;  w);
(b.1) no man m prefers to be matched to another man  m's mate and consume   m:
if ( m) 2 W, then um(z) = um((m);m)  um(( m);  m); and
(b.2) no man m envies a single man  m:
if ( m) =  m, then um(z) = um((m);m)  um(m;  m).
Allocations that are ecient and envy-free are sometimes called fair (Varian, 1974).
A solution associates with each economy a non-empty set of feasible allocations.
The Pareto solution P associates with each economy its set of ecient allocations. To
show that for all e 2 E, P(e) 6= ; one can dene a serial dictatorship allocation as follows:
2Results would not change if we restrict the model to only allow for 
 2 R+.
3Again, results would not change if we restrict the model to only allow for 
 2 R+ and  2 RN
+.
2based on a xed order, men can sequentially choose their partner, maybe respecting individ-
ual rationality,4 and if 
 > 0, then some xed woman ~ w 2 W receives the full amount 
,
but if 
 < 0, then some xed man ~ m 2 M receives it.
The no-envy solution F associates with each economy its set of envy-free allocations. To
show that for all e 2 E, F(e) 6= ; one can always assign the feasible allocation where all
agents are single and 
 is equally divided among all agents.
3 Fairness: An Impossibility
The matching model we have introduced is closely related to indivisible goods economies
where a set of indivisible objects and an amount of money has to be allocated among a
set of agents (see for instance Svensson, 1983; Maskin, 1985; Alkan et al., 1991). In these
models, typically fair allocations exist if either consumptions of money are unbounded below
or the amount of money available is large enough. In a recent paper, Velez (2008) proves
this existence result for a general model that in addition to the previously studied models
includes situations with externalities (e.g., inequality aversion or altruism).
Our matching model shares similar features to the indivisible object models mentioned
above; the only dierence is that in our model the agents are also the objects that have to be
assigned. Given the discrete character of the original marriage market model as introduced
in Section 1, it is easy to see that eciency and envy-freeness might not be compatible:
consider a three agent example with two women who would like to be matched to the same
man. Hence, our question is if similarly as for the indivisible objects allocation model a
suciently large amount of money 
 (or unbounded consumptions of money from below)
would restore the possibility for fair allocations. The next theorem answers this question.
Theorem 1. There exist proles of value functions v such that for all e  (v;
),
P(e) \ F(e) = ;:
Proof. Let N = fw1;w2;m1;m2g and v as described in Table 1.
i vw1(i) vw2(i) vm1(i) vm2(i)
w1 0 - 3 3
w2 - 0 1 2
m1 3 3 0 -
m2 2 1 - 0
Table 1: A prole of value functions for which no fair allocation exists.
The only ecient matchings in this market are  such that (w1) = m1 and (w2) = m2
and 0 such that 0(w1) = m2 and 0(w2) = m1. Hence,
P(e) = f(;) j  2 RN such that
P
i = 




4A matching  is individually rational if no agent would prefer to be single, i.e., for all i 2 N, (i) i i.
3Case 1: Let z  (;). To avoid that w2 envies w1, we need that uw2((w2);w2) = 1+w2 
3 + w1 = uw2((w1);w1). Hence, for z 2 F(e) we need w2  2 + w1 to hold. But then,
uw1((w1);w1) = 3 + w1  1 + w2 < 2 + w2 = uw1((w2);w2) and w1 envies w2. Thus,
z 62 F(e).
Case 2: Let z  (0;). To avoid that m1 envies m2, we need that um1(0(m1);m1) =
1 + m1  3 + m2 = um1(0(m2);m2). Hence, for z 2 F(e) we need m1  2 + m2 to hold.
But then, um2((m2);m2) = 3+m2  1+m1 < 2+m1 = um2(0(m1);m1) and m2 envies
m1. Thus, z 62 F(e).
Since Cases 1 and 2 cover all ecient allocations, it follows that P(e) \ F(e) = ;.
Note that in the proof of Theorem 1 we have not used any information on 
 (its size or
sign) or feasible transfers (transfers described by  could be negative as well). Furthermore,
in a two-sided model with an equal number of men and women where feasibility excludes
single agents, even eciency can be omitted from Theorem 1.
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